Why does Roenicke love the sac bunt so much?

[adambr2]

Some of the old school ways of thinking on sacrifice bunting have just been lost on me because the numbers simply don't support it.

 

http://shutdowninning.com/5/post/2012/04/sacrificial-silliness.html

 

From 1993 until 2010, data was collected on all baserunning situations for every game and the likelihood of scoring runs.

 

With a runner on 2nd and 0 out, a team averages 1.17 runs. With a runner on 3rd and 1 out, it is .989 runs. The second that Roenicke sent Bianchi up to sac bunt in the 10th inning today, he willingly lowered his team's expected runs that inning.

 

So one might argue that the only objective was to score 1 run. More was irrelevant. On the road still having to hold the Reds in the bottom of the inning I would disagree (at home that would have obviously been true). So they compiled the stats for the likelihood of just scoring at all.

 

With a runner on 2nd and 0 out, the chance of scoring is 63.7%. With a runner on 3rd and 1 out, it's 67.4%. So you have increased your chances, albeit by only 3.7%, but this STILL doesn't take into account the chance of failure on the sac (which obviously is what happened).

 

My belief is, there is loads of historical data available to the average Joe on the wisdom of sacrifice bunting, and this data continues to be ignored for whatever reason by guys like Roenicke who have been in baseball for years. For seemingly no other reason than just that's the way it's always been done.

[adambr2]

I don't have the stats of what percentage of sac bunts are actually successful, but I think it should also be pointed out that there are a number of things that can go wrong. You can strike out if you're foolish enough to keep trying with 2 strikes. You can put yourself in a quick 0-2 hole which leads to an unfavorable count. You can lose the lead runner on a fielders choice if it's not a good bunt. You can pop up the bunt.

 

So many different potential risks for something that isn't necessarily a good idea even if it was a sure thing. To me, it's maddening.

[PrinceFielderx1]

Why ask a player to bunt when they have proven they can't? There comes a point when you just quit asking. Bunting is only for pitchers and struggling bench players that have proven they can bunt.

[lcbj68c]

Other things also go RIGHT for the offense when they try to sac bunt. Pitcher gets worried trying to prevent the bunt that they throw a wild pitch. Or try not to be fine and avoid the strike zone leading to a walk or hit batter. Or the defense fields and tries to get greedy and get the out at 3rd and throws the ball into left field. A successful sac bunt wouldn't have mattered in this case as Segura couldn't lift a ball far enough anyhow. I do agree that the alternative to the bunt I would have preferred was a left handed hitter. Somebody would could have made contact and moved the runner to 3rd on a fly ball or ground ball WHILE still having the potential for a base hit.

[adambr2]

I really doubt that there is any correlation between a sac bunt attempt and an increased likelihood of a wild pitch, or a sac bunt and increased chance of a walk/HBP. In fact I don't recall any situations of a wild pitch on a sac bunt (not saying there haven't been, just not that I can think of). Most pitchers are more than happy to throw a strike and get a free out.

 

As you pointed out Segura is also a very poor option for 3rd and 1 out even if the sac works.

[SRB]

I think bunting is often stupid too, but I don't get why historical run expectancy values are always used to make the argument. Surely the identity of the batters at the plate, on deck, and in the hole dramatically change the run expectancies in a given situation?

[Oxy]

Some of the old school ways of thinking on sacrifice bunting have just been lost on me because the numbers simply don't support it.

 

http://shutdowninning.com/5/post/2012/04/sacrificial-silliness.html

 

From 1993 until 2010, data was collected on all baserunning situations for every game and the likelihood of scoring runs.

 

With a runner on 2nd and 0 out, a team averages 1.17 runs. With a runner on 3rd and 1 out, it is .989 runs. The second that Roenicke sent Bianchi up to sac bunt in the 10th inning today, he willingly lowered his team's expected runs that inning.

 

So one might argue that the only objective was to score 1 run. More was irrelevant. On the road still having to hold the Reds in the bottom of the inning I would disagree (at home that would have obviously been true). So they compiled the stats for the likelihood of just scoring at all.

 

With a runner on 2nd and 0 out, the chance of scoring is 63.7%. With a runner on 3rd and 1 out, it's 67.4%. So you have increased your chances, albeit by only 3.7%, but this STILL doesn't take into account the chance of failure on the sac (which obviously is what happened).

 

My belief is, there is loads of historical data available to the average Joe on the wisdom of sacrifice bunting, and this data continues to be ignored for whatever reason by guys like Roenicke who have been in baseball for years. For seemingly no other reason than just that's the way it's always been done.

 

 

To actually have a relevant statistical study of this, one would need to directly study the situation of a guy on 2nd with 0 outs, then split the results by "attempted sac bunt" vs. "swing away" from that point on. I presume that the 63.7% of the time a team scores at least one run with a guy on 2nd and 0 outs INCLUDES times when a team uses a sac bunt to get him to third. From THAT point on, they score 67.4% of the time. The numbers get muddied.

 

Matchups change everything anyway. You should know who is a good bunter and who is a bad bunter (although RR might not care as evidenced by Overbay's attempted bunts the other day).

[Oxy]

I think bunting is often stupid too, but I don't get why historical run expectancy values are always used to make the argument. Surely the identity of the batters at the plate, on deck, and in the hole dramatically change the run expectancies in a given situation?

 

Only if you are SURE that your players are not androids.

[DHonks]

the issue in the game wasn't the bunt. The issue was taking out a hot pitcher that had just dominated some hitters and does well against righties AND lefties, and replacing him with someone with less success against a known Brewers-killer in Phillips.

[DoubleSwitch]

I was all right with pulling Smith for Kintzler, although it's probably not the choice I would have made. If Smith gives up a hit then people will go for his head for ignoring the platoon advantage. As a guy who in the past has (sometimes rightly) been criticized for not playing matchups well, I think he's done a pretty good job managing the pen, although I suppose it's not hard with the way they've been throwing. The bunt choice was awful, and I guess that's just one of those Roenicke things we have to live with. When I saw Bianchi I was thinking 'Hey, don't they have Reynolds?' and then a sinking feeling set in as I realized what was happening. It was an even worse decision because Jean 'pound everything into the ground' Segura was batting next. He's probably one of the least likely guys to give you a sac fly.

[JohnBriggs12]

the issue in the game wasn't the bunt. The issue was taking out a hot pitcher that had just dominated some hitters and does well against righties AND lefties, and replacing him with someone with less success against a known Brewers-killer in Phillips.

 

You are absolutely correct. They didn't acquire Smith to be a LOOGY did they? Melvin needs to have a sit down with Roenicke. Smith is supposed to be a potential starter that can go multiple innings. But Roenicke has fallen into push button managing. Not only was Smith in total command, but Kintzler isn't far removed from the DL and hasn't been real sharp since he returned.

 

On the bunting issue, in today's game where strikeouts are so common, it's a lot harder to get a guy in from third with 1 out. It's also harder to bunt hard throwing relievers. Now LeCune isn't a hard thrower, but that's a guy a hitter with bat control should be able to hit a ground ball to the right side off of.

 

This loss is on Roenicke. It was a "Ned Yost" moment.

[lcbj68c]

I really doubt that there is any correlation between a sac bunt attempt and an increased likelihood of a wild pitch, or a sac bunt and increased chance of a walk/HBP. In fact I don't recall any situations of a wild pitch on a sac bunt (not saying there haven't been, just not that I can think of). Most pitchers are more than happy to throw a strike and get a free out.

 

As you pointed out Segura is also a very poor option for 3rd and 1 out even if the sac works.

 

 

Happens all the time at the youth level. Obviously this is the MLB, but I've seen it there as well. For whatever reason, when a hitter shows bunt, the pitcher loses their mind at times and start throwing the ball all over like Derrick Turnbow.

[logan82]

Some of the old school ways of thinking on sacrifice bunting have just been lost on me because the numbers simply don't support it.

 

http://shutdowninning.com/5/post/2012/04/sacrificial-silliness.html

 

From 1993 until 2010, data was collected on all baserunning situations for every game and the likelihood of scoring runs.

 

With a runner on 2nd and 0 out, a team averages 1.17 runs. With a runner on 3rd and 1 out, it is .989 runs. The second that Roenicke sent Bianchi up to sac bunt in the 10th inning today, he willingly lowered his team's expected runs that inning.

 

So one might argue that the only objective was to score 1 run. More was irrelevant. On the road still having to hold the Reds in the bottom of the inning I would disagree (at home that would have obviously been true). So they compiled the stats for the likelihood of just scoring at all.

 

With a runner on 2nd and 0 out, the chance of scoring is 63.7%. With a runner on 3rd and 1 out, it's 67.4%. So you have increased your chances, albeit by only 3.7%, but this STILL doesn't take into account the chance of failure on the sac (which obviously is what happened).

 

My belief is, there is loads of historical data available to the average Joe on the wisdom of sacrifice bunting, and this data continues to be ignored for whatever reason by guys like Roenicke who have been in baseball for years. For seemingly no other reason than just that's the way it's always been done.

Bunting in that case lowers the number of runs scored but increases the odds of a run scoring. It probably wasn't a horrible call in this case. It doesn't help that Gomez struck out on 4 pitches out of the zone.

[pacopete4]

It amazes me that people are more mad at RR than they are at the players for not being able to execute something that should come very natural to them as major leaguers. I'd always take my chances trying to get a guy to 3rd base with a guy on 2nd base, no outs and Bianchi at the plate with Gomez behind him. You have one of your worst hitters up followed by one of your best.

[JohnBriggs12]

It amazes me that people are more mad at RR than they are at the players for not being able to execute something that should come very natural to them as major leaguers. I'd always take my chances trying to get a guy to 3rd base with a guy on 2nd base, no outs and Bianchi at the plate with Gomez behind him. You have one of your worst hitters up followed by one of your best.

 

Pitchers bunt all the time and are usually the best sacrifice bunters on the team. If he wanted a bunt there, then let Duke bat as Votto was due up the next inning. You can't simulate bunting in batting practice. Everyone seems to forget that Segura's pop up to short right wouldn't have scored Davis anyway.

 

The game is different than when Roenicke was a player. Getting a run in from 3rd via a flyball against the dominant high strike out relievers of today is much harder than it was in the 80's when usually only the closer had that kind of stuff.

 

Bianchi should have been up there swinging away trying to hit it on the ground to the right side. Doing that, there's a chance he finds a hole too.

 

But by far as DHonks points out the managerial mistake that cost them the game was taking Smith out.

[lcbj68c]

"But by far as DHonks points out the managerial mistake that cost them the game was taking Smith out".

 

Agreed. It was a setup situation. It needed to be Smith or Thornburg pitching the 8th and Rodriguez for the 9th.

[Thurston Fluff]

With a runner on 2nd and 0 out, a team averages 1.17 runs. With a runner on 3rd and 1 out, it is .989 runs. The second that Roenicke sent Bianchi up to sac bunt in the 10th inning today, he willingly lowered his team's expected runs that inning.

 

I think you are looking at the situation wrong. You are looking at the team's number of expected runs in a scenario where the team was more worried about producing a single run. If you want to know if the strategy was right you would have to find something that showed which scenario produced a single run more often vs which one produced the most runs.

 

The game is different than when Roenicke was a player. Getting a run in from 3rd via a flyball against the dominant high strike out relievers of today is much harder than it was in the 80's when usually only the closer had that kind of stuff.

 

If it is much harder to get a sac fly isn't it going to be all that much harder to get a base hit or hit where the batter wants to hit vs the pitcher? Wouldn't it be much easier to a strike out on the first guy up and never get the guy off second with less than 2 outs?

[pacopete4]

This is one of those great things about baseball. There are way more than one way to approach the game. No one will probably 100% agree on whether or not to bunt. There will be some managers who are successful that bunt more than others and there will be managers who stink that bunt more than others. It's just one of those things in baseball.

[Fear The Chorizo]

It was also Bianchi up at the plate, not Ryan Braun - if the situation is a runner on 2nd and no outs, tie game in extra innings, weak hitter up at the plate, there isn't even a decision to be made. You try to bunt and get the runner over the 3B with 1 man out. If a guy like Bianchi can't execute a sacrifice bunt, that's on him. On the other hand, this team appears to be poor at bunting, and it's terrible at being selective at the plate...not a good combination to try and play small ball and drive runners in with sac flies. If a pitcher gets a guy at 3rd with 1 out, obviously he's not going to give a hitter anything easy to hit into the OF - that leads to a walk and the potential for a big inning if the hitter actually is selective.

 

The decision to pull Smith out of the game yesterday is what cost them - that combined with having an offense that simply can't seem to score in bunches. Even during this 3-4 road trip, the pitching gave them a shot to win 7 of those games...the offense needs to start scoring more runs. I mean, two of those wins were because their pitchers supplied the offense (Peralta against Cincy and Lohse against STL). If those unlikely hits don't happen we're talking about a 1-6 road trip and huge concerns. A big part of that is not having Braun anchoring the lineup for 1/3 of the team's games thus far. If he only plays 110 games this season, his current pace, there's zero chance this team makes the playoffs.

[trwi7]

Why are we only talking about a weak hitter in reference to making the decision to bunt? Assuming the bunt was successful, why not talk about the odds of the next batter or two getting that run in. Did anyone really think the hacking, ground ball machine Segura was going to have a great chance to get Davis in from 3rd if Bianchi successfully lays the bunt down? What about Schafer after that?

 

That's one of the reasons I thought it was a horrible decision. Even if Bianchi is successful, what are the chances Segura and Schafer get him in? Lucroy or Ramirez I could understand since there's a reasonable chance they hit a ball deep enough into the outfield to score Davis.

[Fear The Chorizo]

Even if Bianchi is successful, what are the chances Segura and Schafer get him in?

 

IMO much better with a runner at 3rd and 1 out compared to them needing a base hit to score Davis. The infield comes in with a guy on 3rd and creates a ton more holes for grounders to get through, too. Going up trying to hit a sac fly is the worst thing to do in that situation - try to hit the ball hard and hope the defensive adjustments made with a runner on 3rd improve your chances to score that run, whether that be by sac fly, base hit, or drawing a walk to give the next hitter a chance to do damage. Or, put a squeeze on right after a sac bunt and watch everyone's head explode on this board!

[adambr2]

 

I think you are looking at the situation wrong. You are looking at the team's number of expected runs in a scenario where the team was more worried about producing a single run. If you want to know if the strategy was right you would have to find something that showed which scenario produced a single run more often vs which one produced the most runs.

 

 

I addressed this in the original post. I also disagree with the strategy of lowering your expected runs in that situation to increase your odds of scoring one run by a mere 3.7%.

 

If you are at home and it's a walkoff, obviously 1 run is as good as 4. So that's different. On the road, it's still a slim margin with no insurance. Even K-Rod will blow one sooner or later.

[monty57]

To actually have a relevant statistical study of this, one would need to directly study the situation of a guy on 2nd with 0 outs, then split the results by "attempted sac bunt" vs. "swing away" from that point on.

 

That's always been my thoughts on the matter. How often a runner scores when a bunt is attempted vs how often a runner scores when a bunt is not attempted.

 

Works for stolen bases as well.

[Fear The Chorizo]

Getting a runner over to 3rd with less than 2 outs creates a ton of offensive advantages for a team that having a runner at 2nd and no outs doesn't.

 

From 3rd with 1 out, a run can score by:

 

hit

sac fly

sac grounder/safety squeeze

suicide squeeze

wild pitch/passed ball

a 1-base fielding or throwing error

balk

 

From 2nd, with 0 or 1 outs, a run can score by:

 

hit

horrible 2-base fielding or throwing error

 

Giving up an out to move the runner to 3rd by a sac bunt isn't the best option during many game situations, but late when 1 run can win the game it's tough to argue against bunting in that spot. Plus, there are certainly occasions where playing small ball early in an inning leads to a crooked # getting put up if the team executes. Bunting guys to 3rd leads to intentional walks or infielders shifting in to cut off the runner at the plate. The added baserunners, infield positioning, and pitching strategies that are required for those defensive strategies make it easier for a batter to get a hit and blow the game open. Putting stress on a defense and on the pitcher is a big advantage if you have hitters capable of being selective.

 

All that said, the problems this Brewers team have are a lack of bunting skill and a lack of selective hitters to take advantage of these situations even if they are executed. RR's in a no-win situation when the team can't execute small ball or occasionally put up a crooked # by getting on base more often. The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. Unless it's a pitcher sac bunting, small ball with this Brewers team is bordering on insanity right now. It'd be nice to mix the strategy up a bit, even if all that accomplishes is making the opponent and fans wonder what the hell they're going to do next...

[adambr2]

Getting a runner over to 3rd with less than 2 outs creates a ton of offensive advantages for a team that having a runner at 2nd and no outs doesn't.

 

From 3rd with 1 out, a run can score by:

 

hit

sac fly

sac grounder/safety squeeze

suicide squeeze

wild pitch/passed ball

a 1-base fielding or throwing error

balk

 

From 2nd, with 0 or 1 outs, a run can score by:

 

hit

horrible 2-base fielding or throwing error

 

Giving up an out to move the runner to 3rd by a sac bunt isn't the best option during many game situations, but late when 1 run can win the game it's tough to argue against bunting in that spot. Plus, there are certainly occasions where playing small ball early in an inning leads to a crooked # getting put up if the team executes. Bunting guys to 3rd leads to intentional walks or infielders shifting in to cut off the runner at the plate. The added baserunners, infield positioning, and pitching strategies that are required for those defensive strategies make it easier for a batter to get a hit and blow the game open. Putting stress on a defense and on the pitcher is a big advantage if you have hitters capable of being selective.

 

All that said, the problems this Brewers team have are a lack of bunting skill and a lack of selective hitters to take advantage of these situations even if they are executed. RR's in a no-win situation when the team can't execute small ball or occasionally put up a crooked # by getting on base more often. The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. Unless it's a pitcher sac bunting, small ball with this Brewers team is bordering on insanity right now. It'd be nice to mix the strategy up a bit, even if all that accomplishes is making the opponent and fans wonder what the hell they're going to do next...

 

It also creates the disadvantage of working with 1 out instead of 0 out, thus why the situations are almost equal in the odds of scoring a run.

 

I agree that we should be mixing up the strategy a little bit, at the very least. Our bunting situations have gone way beyond predictable.