Question about "Moneyball"

[BCZF]

Ok.. First a disclaimer.. I am not what you'd call a stathead,geek,nerd, etc..I do however know this sport, and this books effects upon it.

I read Moneyball years ago because everyone else read it, and all I seem to remember taking from it was the opening (chapters?) about Prince and how his projections were poor and how foolish the Brewers were to recruit him. Forgive me for not remembering the specifics of his argument, but I seem to remember a particular derision shown Prince during the course of the book.

With the movie opening, I just want to ask people more familiar with the intricacies of the info in the book, how does the info in the book still hold up? And seeing as how the A's dont even merit a blip on the radar, was his method of scouting rendered useless because of the books success or was the method an anomaly to begin with?

[ramssuperbowl99]

The underlying theory of "Moneyball" is that small market teams need to find market inefficiencies in order to compete with big market teams consistently. Back when the book was written, OBP was undervalued and athleticism was overvalued. Obviously that no longer applies as every front office, Ed Wade nonwithstanding, uses more advanced metrics.

Nowadays, I think Moneyball comes into play in the draft or players who don't fit in with their clubhouse. The two best examples of this are Alex Anthogfnvalous of the Blue Jays and Andrew Friedmann of the Rays. They spend tons of money on draft picks (through accumulation of supplemental picks and by signing overslot high schoolers) and frequently trade for guys like Colby Rasmus who fall out of favor with their FO's. Ultimately, the buy-low philosophy of Moneyball still applies.

[NYChez]

I was confused why Beane thought it was ok to draft a fat catcher but wouldn't draft Prince because he was fat.

[Thurston Fluff]

was his method of scouting rendered useless because of the books success or was the method an anomaly to begin with?

 

Maybe both. Finding those inefficiencies have become more difficult since everyone is now looking for them. They are also all using the same sabre tools now where in the past only some did. In the respect of using stats to find the inefficiencies the book may have something to do with his lack of success now. Someday someone will find a different tool to use while everyone else is still using today's tools and will get a similar advantage. Then it will be copied and no longer an advantage until another innovation is found and so on. In the respect of the specific approach to finding the inefficiencies it's an anomaly. The process of continuously finding inefficiencies is often a string of anomalies.

[rluzinski]

I was confused why Beane thought it was ok to draft a fat catcher but wouldn't draft Prince because he was fat.

Yeh, it never really made much sense. Sure, a players with Fielder's body type probably doesn't project well into their 30's but they are already a free agent by then so that matters little to the team that drafts them.

[Flood Pants]

I think what tends to get lost in the discussion regarding the book is the fascinating character studies within which have little to do with stat analysis. I think my absolute favorite chapter involves Scott Hatterberg's transformation from failed catcher to valuable first baseman. It's a fun story about creative coaching and playing to a player's particular strengths. If I remember correctly, there's a description of an epic at-bat between Hatterberg and Jamie Moyer that gives a unique insight into how both players mentally approached the game.

 

I loved this book!

[monty57]

It's been a long time since I read it, but my recollection of the Fielder section read something along the lines of "a player so fat even Beane wouldn't draft him, and that's saying a lot." I believe the author ripped the Brewers as a team that always screws up drafts, so it made sense to him that the Brewers would be the ones to draft Prince.

 

Just my opinion, but in the current market, it appears to me that the overvalued category would include "team control." I love prospects, and teams like the Brewers need to have "cheap" players, but when MLB MVP candidates aren't worth a top 10 prospect, they're probably overvalued. Team control seems to be worth more than talent in some cases. Melvin seems to be bucking this trend this year, so we'll see if it works.

 

And seeing as how the A's dont even merit a blip on the radar, was his method of scouting rendered useless because of the books success or was the method an anomaly to begin with?

 

To be able to field a competitive team on Oakland's budget is impressive, but I do wonder how much was methodology and how much was "luck" in getting Mulder, Hudson and Zito all through the system at the same time and how much was steroids with Giambi, Conseco, Tejada, McGwire, etc. Steroids add power, but they don't add plate discipline, so finding guys with good plate discipline played well in the steroids era.

 

That said, the methodology certainly wasn't "rendered useless," as Moneyball exposed Beane's methodology and SABRmetrics to those who previously didn't want to hear it. Statistical study has been around a long time, but Moneyball made it so public that it's now pretty difficult for anyone in baseball to disregard it. I wouldn't say it revolutionized baseball, but it did speed up the revolution. It led to a lot of heated battles, but I believe most teams have now realized the value to utilizing both SABR studies and scouting. And, yes, it's probably caused a lot of GMs to go out of their way to find the market inefficiencies.

[Ayt]

It was so arrogant of Billy Beane to write a book about himself.

 

/Joe Morgan

[istanbultaye]

The depictions of Billy Beane pulling off trades may have also made it more difficult for him to convince other GMs to go along with favorable trades as well.

[RockCoCougars]

Inherit a few steroid fueled, stud pre-FA hitters, a possible borderline HOF pitcher, and then hit the lottery by drafting two consecutive college pitchers in the first round who both make a huge impact within two seasons. Parlay all that into some LCS runs. I'm waiting for the sequel.

[Baldkin]

Well, they spent 57% of the league average on wins last year, and won 81 games. If the Brewers had to have a sub 70M payroll this year, that would mean Doug Davis and Dave Bush starting instead of Wolf and Greinke.

 

From 2006-2008:

Six clubs have averaged more than 81 wins with payrolls under the league

mean of $89.86M. The best of the best was Minnesota (winner of the

"doing the most with the least" award), followed by Cleveland, Toronto,

Arizona, Milwaukee, and Oakland. All but the Blue Jays made the

playoffs once, which probably says as much about Toronto's competition

as anything else.

[RockCoCougars]

Sal Bando was pushing 80 wins as well for a few years in the late 90's with the Brewers either dead last or near last in baseball in payroll. His record on trades was probably a tad better than Beane's though. Too bad that he didn't 'hit' on a college pitcher (or anything else for that matter) until his last draft....

[cwolf2012]

Beane is still very good at identifying good pitching, especially college age pitchers (Cahill, Gonzalez, Anderson in particular). He hasn't, however, been able to develop any hitters whatsoever. Teams have wised up to overvaluing relief pitching, so he hasn't been able to sell his relievers for prospects for a while. I think that was something he did particularly well in the early 2000s.

 

Jack Z and his group identifying hitters + Beane and Co identifying pitchers would make a team quite formidable after 5-6 seasons.

[rluzinski]

We also have to remember that Moneyball wasn't an academic study. It was designed to entertain and sell books.