Brewer 2011 Base Running, Quantified

[rluzinski]

I forgot that before moving on to the Pirates, Dan Fox worked for Baseball Prospectus and gave them some pretty nice base running metrics. Here are some articles describing how they work:

Running the Bases: Part 1

Running the Bases: Part 2

Running the Bases: Part 3

There's an article up at BP about the RR's base running philosophy and how well it's faired so far:

"... (You) can see that Runnin' Ron's team isn't off to a great start. The Brewers are in the bottom third of the majors and are 12th in the National League in making the most of their opportunities on the basepaths. Among National League Central teams, only the Cardinals rank below them."

Article Link

Looks like most of the problem has been with base advancement attempts on ground balls, with Gomez responsible for most of it (on 5 groundball base advancement opportunities?). There were a bunch of groundball outs at home early on. Was he involved in any of those?

Over 6 weeks, I wouldn't really call this a predictive stats at all but it's certainly interesting to see how they've performed so far. It seems to be that the Brewers have already started to be more conservative on the base paths. Would others agree with that?

[TooLiveBrew]

Any time a manager gladly admits to giving up outs in risky situations, there's a good chance that his decisions won't go over well with fans. Now, whenever a player makes a mistake on the basepaths—say, for example, Casey McGehee trying to stretch a single into a double or Carlos Gomez looking to take third on a misplayed ball in shallow center—fans can add it to the "Runnin' Ron Roenicke" files for future complaints. Well-played aggressive baserunning is far less obvious, of course, so the file is rarely cleared out.

 

Does Larry Granillo read Brewerfan? If not, that's a pretty funny coincidence.

[logan82]

Any time a manager gladly admits to giving up outs in risky situations, there's a good chance that his decisions won't go over well with fans. Now, whenever a player makes a mistake on the basepaths—say, for example, Casey McGehee trying to stretch a single into a double or Carlos Gomez looking to take third on a misplayed ball in shallow center—fans can add it to the "Runnin' Ron Roenicke" files for future complaints. Well-played aggressive baserunning is far less obvious, of course, so the file is rarely cleared out.

 

Does Larry Granillo read Brewerfan? If not, that's a pretty funny coincidence.

I heard Homer use it in a very early interview with Ronald. Homer was asking him which nickname he liked. I have also run across it on Brewcrewball so I believe it is pretty widespread.

[Thurston Fluff]

Over 6 weeks, I wouldn't really call this a predictive stats at all but it's certainly interesting to see how they've performed so far. It seems to be that the Brewers have already started to be more conservative on the base paths. Would others agree with that?

 

I hope they do. There is a difference between aggressive and stupid. Some of them were kind of stupid. Maybe that shouldn't be a surprise. It takes time for players to find that line. I can give them some leeway going over the line early on. I would think, as time wears on, they should get less aggressive because they will stop making those really obvious bad plays. I don't know if that would be less aggressive or just smarter aggression.

[rluzinski]

Yes, it seemed like the Brewer runners at 3B were trying for home on ANYTHING hit on the ground. We can argue about the theoretical break even point for attempting to take home in that situation but I find it hard to believe that it is 100%.

 

I'm glad if RR has already adjusted how aggressive he wants his team to be on the basepaths but shouldn't he know the break even points before the season starts? He shouldn't be using the results of a few games to figure this stuff out.

 

Then again, I believe the Brewer attempted another safety squeeze the other day, so perhaps Runnin' Ron is still chugging along.

[Oxy]

Yes, it seemed like the Brewer runners at 3B were trying for home on ANYTHING hit on the ground. We can argue about the theoretical break even point for attempting to take home in that situation but I find it hard to believe that it is 100%.

 

I'm glad if RR has already adjusted how aggressive he wants his team to be on the basepaths but shouldn't he know the break even points before the season starts? He shouldn't be using the results of a few games to figure this stuff out.

 

Then again, I believe the Brewer attempted another safety squeeze the other day, so perhaps Runnin' Ron is still chugging along.

You can only see so much in Spring Training. Everybody on the team has different instincts, speed, acceleration, and angles around the bases, so there isn't really a set "break even" point that works for everybody at all times. As Ron alluded to earlier and Backupcatchers mentioned, eventually being aggressive on the bases is going to lead to more runs as he and the players learn when to be aggressive and when to hold up. However, it's very difficult to know where that line is until you cross it. Carlos Gomez has crossed the line. Many times. There have been a few too many guys thrown out by 10 feet at home plate. Even the decision making in those situations should be malleable based on score, quality of the defense, and quality of the upcoming hitters though.

[rluzinski]

You can only see so much in Spring Training. Everybody on the team has different instincts, speed, acceleration, and angles around the bases, so there isn't really a set "break even" point that works for everybody at all times.

 

I didn't suggest that there was a set breakeven point that works for each batter and for each situation. I don't think anyone would think that. And I'm not really worried about RR's ability to judge individual base running skills. I am more concerned about the possibility of him not having a firm grasp on how to estimate the break even points.

 

For those not familar the concept of the base advancement break even point, its the odds at which, for the specific situation, the run value of an attempted advancement is equal to the run value of not attempting. Let's look at the sac fly with 2 out scenario. In 2010, teams scored .37 runs with a runner at 3rd and 2 out. They scored .1 runs with no one on and 2 out. So in a perfectly average situation, we are looking at these expected run values:

 

Just after flyout: .37 runs

Successful sac fly: 1+.1 = 1.1 runs

Out at home: 0 runs

 

In that case, the BE point is 1.1/.37 = ~3:1 or 25%. That means the runner only has to be safe 25% of the time to make the send as valuable as a no send. Then you have to consider the skill of the base runner to determine if he can beat that breakeven point.

 

Of course, that's assuming everything is average. In reality, that pre-advance run expectancy is highly dependent on the pitcher in the game and the upcoming batters. You have the heart of the order up against a scrub pitcher and your break point even is going to be higher. Ace against your pitcher? You could out at home 85% of the time and it still might be the right move. These are the kinds of things a 3B couch needs to consider BEFORE he decides whether to send a runner.

 

"However, it's very difficult to know where that line is until you cross it. Carlos Gomez has crossed the line. Many times. There have been a few too many guys thrown out by 10 feet at home plate."

 

The "out by 10 feet" situations aside, a manager has to be careful about looking at the outcome of his strategies too much, too early. There is just too much uncertainty about the outcome and not enough observation points. If RR thought his strategies were correct before the season started, he shouldn't change his mind on a handful of plays. Of course, many managers are very outcome driven, since there performance is measured by it.

[Thurston Fluff]

I don't think it's a change of philosophy as much as the team as a whole learning how to apply the philosophy.

[rluzinski]

I don't think it's a change of philosophy as much as the team as a whole learning how to apply the philosophy.

I'm sure you are correct to some degree. It appears that runners on third aren't trying to advance on every groundball, like they were earlier in the season... or I'm completely wrong on that. Two recent safety squeezes recently, I believe.

[Fear The Chorizo]

I think part of the early season stuff aside from the infield grounder plays at the plate is early bad decisions by Sedar sending guys home from 2nd on hits when they had no chance of beating a decent throw, then players running through a few of his stop signs in similar situations that led to outs at the plate or at third base.

[rluzinski]

Well, another out at the plate last night on a ground ball. Braun was going on contact, as is RR's MO. This aggressiveness on the base paths continues to not work.

[Oxy]

I'm not so sure that Braun was going on contact there. I think he hesitated after it was hit, saw that the ball wasn't hit all that hard and the D wasn't playing up and decided to go for it. It was still a close play and he was arguably safe. Had he been going on contact I think he is safe by a mile and the throw isn't even made.

 

That said, I don't think the contact play should be on when there are 0 outs, unless the D is obviously playing back and giving up the run, or the pitcher/Gomez is on deck.

[rluzinski]

Runner at third, no outs and a ground ball, the runner at third better be pretty sure he can score to make it worth it. Assuming the groundball would otherwise result in an out at first, teams still score at least one run about 2/3rds of the time if the runner stays put. To be fair, had Braun been safe, that would have been a run AND a no out made at first, so it get's complicated.

 

At this point, all we can really do is keep track of how well things turned out. It's a much more difficult to answer whether the strategy was sound before-the-fact.

[MJLiverock]

At this point, all we can really do is keep track of how well things turned out. It's a much more difficult to answer whether the strategy was sound before-the-fact.

I think that is the problem, a lot of hindsight is used in baserunning which is typically a snap decsison by the player and base coach, not necessarily the manager or a probablilty study done by the runner.

Sending runners and making outs always is met with groans and moans of stupid play and runners that are safe are heady base runners or good aggressiveness. Same thing with stolen bases, even if a guy is safe 80% of the time someone always complains about how terrible it is to make outs on the basepaths or derogitory remarks about stolen bases come up.

 

Braun ran through Sedar's stop sign at 3rd earlier this year versus Philly when Halladay was on the mound, Braun was safe so there wasn't an outcry of poor baserunning or blaming the manager for a guy making an out at home.

 

Being aggressive and being stupid are two different things and making some outs being aggressive doesn't bother me, especially if it takes a perfect throw to get guy and its still close, or running a guy like Johnny Damon or Juan Pierre vs. Rick Ankiel. The stupid outs like Gomez getting picked off second or LuCroy getting doubled off second after Gomez was in a run down or a few of McGehee's gaffs this year are the frustrating outs, but I'm not sure how the manager can control those outs short of standing next to the player and telling them not to be stupid.

 

 

 

[Ennder]

I didn't have any problem with Braun going on home on that play, took a perfect play and a perfect blockout at the plate to get him and he very well still might have been called safe. It was also on the road in a pitchers park so I think the run environment is low which makes marginal situations more of a green light. That was an example of good aggressiveness that just didn't work out.

[FVBrewerFan]

Yea, I don't even think it was aggressive. IF was playing back, allowing the run. And it wasn't hit real hard. Braun hesitated for some reason, and that cost him. Still looked safe to me anyhow, but that's another story.

[pebadger]

From a fan psychology standpoint, the early season outs at home were compounded by the failures the Brewers exhibited in failing to make the defensive plays necessary to record the same putouts other teams were posting when the Brewers attempted to score. Creates a certain level of frustration causes folks to place blame and draw conclusions based on the limited evidence at hand. That evidence, butressed by fair helping of inexcusably dumb individual player decisions, makes it hard to come to any objective conclusions about strategy.

[And That]

FanGraphs now has MGL's Ultimate Baserunning (UBR, listed for some reason as Bsr) metric on their site. The Brewers' team UBR is -2.8 WAR, 5th worst in baseball. Casey McGehee clocks in as the 2nd worst baserunner in baseball with a -4.1 UBR. He's slightly better than Paul Konerko.

 

If the Brewers had a neutral UBR, they would have the 3rd highest team offensive WAR in MLB. Such as it is, FanGraphs has them as the 11th best.

 

Link to the UBR announcement.

[rluzinski]

To be clear, UBR does not include stolen bases. That sucks since all SB and CS are not created equal.

[And That]

Shameless self promotion:

 

My new blog, with my thoughts on the topic.

[cwolf2012]

I think you may need to recheck some of your math in that article, And That. I'm going to copy-paste my response from someone who linked to it on BCB.

 

He seems to think the UBR is measured in wins, not runs. I may be mistaken, though. Specifically, these things jump out at me as wrong:

 

“Adding in the Brewers’ stolen base success mitigates the -2.8 UBR WAR somewhat, probably making it closer to -2.6.”

 

You can’t add the SB value into the UBR rating to negate the rating. That’s already covered by wOBA under the batting values.

 

http://www.fangraphs.com/...011&month=0&season1=2011

 

“the Brewers would have the 3rd best offense in baseball (by FanGraphs WAR). Such as it is, the Brewers have the 11th best offense in baseball. Baserunning matters.”

 

I have a really hard time believing that the Brewers have already cost themselves 28 runs with bad baserunning. As bad as they’ve been, I just have a really hard time believing that.

 

Secondly, if it’s measured in runs like I think, I don’t think the gap between 11th and 3rd in baseball is 2.8 runs so far.

[Ennder]

I think that is -2.8 runs which is -.28 WAR. McGehee would have cost us 4 runs on the basepaths this year which seems plausible, he certainly hasn't cost us 4 wins.

[And That]

You're right, I misread the primer. Editing.

 

You can’t add the SB value into the UBR rating to negate the rating. That’s already covered by wOBA under the batting values.

 

Sure you can. I'm just talking about baserunning, not overall offensive value there. It would be a mistake to combine wOBA, UBR and SB stuff.

[Funketown]

Finally checked it out a bit. Just from looking at the leaderboards, it appeals to what I've observed. Konerko, McGehee, Wallace, C. Jones, Ortiz, Howard, Yadier all in the bottom 10. Mostly athletic players on the leaderboard.

 

I wonder what the rule of thumb will be in terms of seasons for this statistic to stabilize and be meaningful. There doesn't seem to be as much noise as UZR data just by looking at it (Prince is always negative, Braun always positive). Fielder in his career is a -25 in UBR, which I guess seems pretty reasonable. Konerko is the worst since 2002 with a -44. Juan Pierre and Figgins are top two, both just over +40.