The "save your closer in extras on the road" rule (Mergers: Baseball Prospectus article; Yost defends himself for not using Cordero)

[adambr2]

Strawboss, I understand what you are saying, so let me use that to support my point here.

 

You are right, there are probably 12 situations during the season where we think, "Cordero would have been PERFECT for that". A 1st and 2nd, nobody out jam in the 7th. A bases loaded, nobody out situation in the 8th.

 

But we don't want to push Cordero's limits. We want him to retain his maximum possible effectiveness.

 

So I'm advocating a more "outside the box" approach.

 

For instance, let's look at a 3 run lead going into the 9th. It's considered a "save" situation. The majority of the time, a manager will use his closer for it.

 

Now, how many innings does a closer use every year on this situation? This is probably more up Russ' territory, but for argument's sake, I'll assume 15 innings per year.

 

But why? Any MLB pitcher worth a roster spot, given a 3 run lead with 3 outs to get, should be able to preserve that lead at least 14 out of 15 tries. You don't need to go with the same reliever every time in this situation. But you should be able to manage about 14 out of 15 successfully, without using your closer. That will be Cordero's effective rate if he doesn't blow another save in that situation the rest of the year.

 

So, how much does it cost us every year, on average, if we don't use our closer to preserve a 3 run, 9th inning lead? 0-1 wins. That's it.

 

That would free up Cordero for 15 innings a year for situations when the use of your closer is more crucial and appropriate, such as an extra innings sudden death situation, a 7th inning jam, or other crucial situation when he may be essential to pull off a win or keep the game from slipping away.

 

Other than these "key" situations, I'd advocate using your closer for a 1 or 2 run lead in the 9th to preserve victory, when the margin for error is less.

 

I know this isn't conventional thinking, but I really do think it makes a lot of sense. If anyone thinks this is flawed logic, feel free to explain.

[logan82]

If you want to have a really effective bulpen you should designate your 2nd best reliever as your closer. Then you can bring in your best guy in the highest leverage situations no matter what the inning. That is not how things work anymore though. Guys have certain designated innings. Wise is our 7th inning or 1st guy out of the pen. Turnbow is the 8th inning guy and Cordeo is the closer. That way they know when they are going to pitch. From what I understand, the best to run the bulpen would be to tell Cordero to start getting ready anytime after the 5th if it looks like the pitcher is getting into a jam in a close game.

[TauPentaRei]

Seattle at Texas last night, Mariners up 1, bottom 8:

 

Reliever X on for the hold gives up a single and a sac bunt.

 

In comes Super-Closer J.J. Putz! (gives up the lead, but convention / protocol / unwritten rule be damned)

 

Just so everyone knows there are managers who will use their closer on the road in the bottom of the eighth... to make sure there is a game to save come bottom nine.

 

Don't want to divert the thread, but it's similar to swinging on a 3 - 0 count. More often than not the bat is on the shoulder, despite knowledge that a meatball is headed your way. Makes sense? No. Conventional? Yes.

[adambr2]

I would just like to point out, that I do not recall one game this season where the "save your closer" rule that we've employed on the road, has worked out in our favor. Not one. I think it may have happened once in the first week of the season.

 

And again, I think you can explain the flawed logic with simple mathematics:

 

A. Margin of error tied on the road in extra's: 0 (you give up a run, like Wise did, and it's game over).

B. Margin of error leading in extra's: >= 1 (could be 1 run, could be 5)

 

So, please, tell me, why is situation A a situation for any closer, whereas situation B is a guy where you NEED your best reliever?

 

Let's say CoCo comes in in the 10th. He shuts the door. The Brewers score 1 in the top of the 11th, and then Wise comes in during the bottom of the 11th and gives up a run to tie it back up at 3.

 

Now, "conventional wisdom" says I'm going to be furious at Ned for blowing Cordero in the 10th, and not "saving" him for the 11th when we had the lead. But I'm not. Why? Because, it is very simple, if Wise gave up a run in the 11th, you can assume he would have given up a run in the 10th, and had he done so, the game would be OVER. At least now, it is still tied, and we still have a CHANCE to win, but had we SAVED Cordero for the 11th, there would never have been an 11th, because Wise would have given up the run in the 10th.

 

Again, tell me how the above paragraph does not make sense, because it makes perfect sense to me.

 

The only possible logic for not using your closer early in extras is to save his arm for another day. And at this point in the season, savings arms be damned.

[biedergb]

It's like in the playoffs, saving your best pitcher in game 6 (assuming he's available) when down 3-2, just to save him for game 7. Does it happen, sure. But if you can go with your best guy in game 6 to make sure there's a game 7, you go for it. Sure you may not have your best guy in for the pivotal game 7, but if you don't trust someone enough to trot them out for game 7, why pitch them in game 6 and give yourself less chance of getting to a game 7.

[jeffy]

I've always thought your best reliever should pitch in the most crucial situation.

 

The problem is, the save stat is tied to money, and the manager has to keep his pitcher happy.

 

What point is more important?

 

Bases loaded, no out in the 7th in a 4-1 game... or 9th inning, no one on, no one out in the same 4-1 game.

 

Obviously, the 7th is much more high leverage. I'd want Coco in the game in that situation, only it will never happen.

 

Pretty much, the only team that runs their team this way is the A's, and that comes straight down from Billy Beane in the front office.

[JohnBriggs12]

The biggest problem is that when you call a strategy a "rule", it allows the manager not have to really think or be accountable. Now most times in the case of Ned Yost that is a good thing.

 

However every game is different. High scoring offensive games are different than low scoring tense games. Either stopping momentum or keeping momentum on your side is key. Also key is putting yourself in the oppenents heads.

 

Weeks' HR should have resulted in a huge momentum shift. Frankly I would have put Cordero in there in the 9th instead of the flammable Spurling. Having to see Cordero after giving up a lead would have kept the hammer down. Yost was extremely lucky to get to the 10th. Spurling hung pitch after pitch in the 9th, but luckily the Astros didn't have Justin Morneau batting and Stetter probably would have wild pitched in the winning run if the line out to short had been fouled off. But the bottom of the 9th close call, did get the Astros mentally back in the game. After the Brewers went quietly in the 10th, imagine the Astro confidence level seeing Matt Wise come in. They knew they had the game right there. I knew it. Jeff Wagner on WTMJ said today he knew it, as did virtually every fan that has watched Brewer games the past 2 months.

 

But somehow the guy in the dougout couldn't get past an unwritten rule.

 

It's not exactly like he hasn't been bitten by this before. Everyone remembers Prince's inside the park HR that tied the game in the 9th vs the Twins and how quickly that positive emotion was quelled when instead of bringing in Cordero, Yost brought in Spurling who gave up a walk off to the first batter in the bottom of the 9th.

[lukevan]

Either stopping momentum or keeping momentum on your side is key. Also key is putting yourself in the oppenents heads.

 

I don't really see those as keys to winning at all. I'm not going to debate Ned's moves because it'll make me scream...

 

But momentum at the very least is debatable as to whether it exists or not. Hard to say a different move should've been made because it would've kept the momentum going better than another. If momentum does exist, you'd think it would extend to Spurling as well as Cordero.

[JohnBriggs12]

Lukevan,

 

How on earth is Spurling who has an OPS against of .814 just as likely to keep momentum on his team's side as Cordero who's OPS against is .539? Sending in the likes of Spurling and Wise, just reinvigorates the opponents who have to face them.

 

That's like saying the Packers are just as well off after a big turnover, to send in the third string QB (if they had one) instead of Brett Favre.

[lukevan]

you missed the point. I'm saying that how does the momentum from the PREVIOUS inning carry over to one pitcher more than another. You use the guy you decide to use, I'm not agreeing with Yost using Spurling, just saying that momentum plays no factor. I would've used Cordero because he's the better pitcher.

 

But the bottom of the 9th close call, did get the Astros mentally back in the game.

 

This is what I have a problem with. How do you know this?

[adambr2]

Here's a blog from JSOnline on why the Brewers didn't bring in Cordero:

http://blogs.jsonline.com/brewers/archive/2007/09/20/why-yost-decided-to-use-wise.aspx

If he brings in Cordero and he pitches two innings and the Brewers don't score, he has to come out of the game. Then, if the Brewers score after that, he has nobody to close the game. That's why Yost refuses to use his closer on the road in a tie game, like it or not.

The part in bold is what absolutely closes my mind. "If the Brewers score after that, he has nobody to close the game." Why doesn't he? Are Capuano, Aquino, McClung, and Wise definitely going to give up runs before they can record 3 outs? Is it impossible for them to come into the game with a lead? If they are definitely going to give up runs, wouldn't it be better for it to happen when we have the lead, rather than when it's tied and we'll definitely lose if they score? Are baseball managers so infatuated with the concept of a "save" that breaking that flawed logic is just taboo??

[biedergb]

Once again that's the problem with that logic. You don't trust these guys to keep a lead if you are winning, but you trust them enough to keep it tied?!? I don't get it. You put the guys you expect will keep the other team off the scoreboard, and wait for the offense to knock in runs. At that point you go with the best you have after that, and if it's a 2 run lead, then you have to bring in Wise because he's what's left, so be it, you gave it your best shot. How is Wise going to be more effective in the 10th with no margin for error, than the 11th/12th/13th/etc with a run or two of margin.

[Ennder]

Yep it makes no sense, especially when the chuckle heads he throws out there are facing the middle of the order. You let Cordero get through the tough part of the order and hope your backend guys can get you through the bottom of the order with the lead.

[logan82]

Are there any websites that will show statistics on managers? I am talking about their general strategies.

[TooLiveBrew]

Not sure if this helps, logan, but it's the best I could find.

 

Wins-Added Manager Measurement and Evaluation Rating System (WAMMERS), by Bradford Doolittle (KC Star)

 

Fwiw, his ratings put Yost 80th out of the 100 he studied (MLB mgrs. from 1988-2004) - but I'm sorry in that it doesn't really highlight strategies, merely analyzes impact.

[logan82]

Alou has done well with his good teams and bad with his bad teams and he's had more bad teams. There may also be a bias in this system towards good teams, though the rankings year-by-year are a mix of winning and losing teams

I would have to say that there is a bias, or at the very least it shows that managers are inconsistent in wins added. Looking further down, year to year, you see that Cox and LaRussa are at the top one year and the bottom the next year.

 

I also think the first group should have been sorted by WA162 not WA. It rewards managers who manage a long time, not how good they are year to year. It looks like a somewhat flawed model. Of course maybe managers are inconsistent year to year or maybe their strategies at the very least are.

[Mass Haas]

Joe Sheehan of Baseball Prospectus:

 

Where Was Coco?

[Brawndo the Thirst Mutilat]

Joe Sheehan of Baseball Prospectus:

 

Where Was Coco?

 

My favorite line in that article is the closing one:

 

If you can't recognize that "tied in the tenth inning, other team's best guys up, a half-game out of first place, 12 days left" is about the highest-leverage situation you're going to come across, and act accordingly, it's possible that you're not the best person for your job.

True dat double true, Mr. Sheehan.

[logan82]

Like I have said before, I will not argue that the misuse of CoCo, I am just disputing that another manager wouldn't make the same choice with his closer.

 

Both interesting articles by the way.

[AdvantageSchneider]

The great thing is that the Brewers are going to come back and win the NL Central. Then they are going to win the NL penant. Then they are going to get to the 7th game of the world series. At that point the game will be tied in the 8th inning and Yost will call upon Wise or Spurling or Aquino to pitch since the game will be on the road and Coco will be sitting in the bullpen while one of our lesser relievers loses the series for us. Book it.

[YoGo24]

http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=6735

Just bashes Yost for his non usage of CoCo last night and his misuse of his bullpen. I dont know if this goes here or not. Might be in the vent thread buts its very interesting and could cause some good debate

[valpocrewsader]

Hmph, I never released the "timing" blunder that this writer points out. That just makes me more mad....

[AJAY]

Obviously Ned must have gotten the word that he was being blasted on talk radio and websites all day . . .

http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=665347

[AJAY]

"For me, it just doesn't make any sense," he said. "If your stopper comes in the ball game (with the score tied), he's got to get six outs (to close the game if his team scores).

 

"So, if you put your stopper in the game you better hope you score the next inning so he can close it out. If you don't score, he has to throw another three outs for you to have an opportunity (to win).

 

"If you throw your stopper out there for three innings and then you score, then you've got a decision. Do I throw him out there again and have him unavailable for the next three days? Or do I bring somebody else in?"

 

 

 

Sorry Ned, you can just use your closer for one inning when you are clearly in a jam and your current pitcher stinks and the season is on the line. You can always take your chances with other relievers later in the game.

[bacon06]

I side with Yost. Why use your closer when the game is tied on the road when there is no garuntee that you're going to score in the top half? So when you do score a run, you don't have to throw out pitchers like Wise and McClung to get a save because there's no one left in the pen.